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ELECTRONIC COMMERCE SYMPOSIUM

OF GOVERNMENTS AND GOVERNANCE
Bj A. Michael Froomkin t

ABSTRACT
The Magaziner Report focuses on achieving short-term goals without
giving sufficient consideration to long-term consequences affecting the
structure of Internet governance and democracy in general. This overly
pragmatic approach creates a paradoxical climate: overly-friendly to
government intervention (in e-commerce regulation) while also overlywilling to defer to privatized governance structures (in other areas). As
the recent World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") domain
name/trademark process demonstrates, certain Internet governance processes raise several questions, not least discerning whether such processes
include adequate notice and consultation. More traditional democratic
processes, such as legislation and regulation, have routinized means of
giving affected parties notice of pending decisions and of soliciting public comment. Other privatized governance processes may be equally or
more legitimate, but not inevitably.
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INTRODUCTION

The second anniversary of A Frameworkfor Global Electronic Commerce' ("Magaziner Report") provides an almost overdue occasion to reflect on U.S. government policy towards governance of an increasingly
commercial Internet. In the two years since the Magaziner Report, a
trickle of e-commerce has turned into a surge, and transactional floods
loom. Few, however, foresaw the extent to which this flow of commercialization would create opportunities to erode, and perhaps ultimately
overwhelm, the ad hoc governance structures that created and channel the
Internet.
When viewed in light of these developments, the Magaziner Report
seems so focused on achieving its short-term goals that it is insufficiently
concerned with the long-term consequences of its recommendations for
both the structure of Internet governance and of democratic government
itself. The result of this overly pragmatic approach is to create a climate
for too much governance-of the wrong sort.
Before turning to the implicit institutional theory found (or not found)
in the Magaziner Report, I must disclose a source of potential bias. Having
been appointed as the "public interest representative" to a Panel of Experts
convened by the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") to
advise it on conflicts between Internet domain names and trademarks, I am
embroiled in a skirmish that forms part of the global war regarding the
future of Internet governance. As an international body all too willing to
take up the reigns of global governance, WIPO attempted to create global
e-commerce friendly rules by a process that, left to itself, seemed likely to
consist predominantly of meeting with commercial interest groups and
giving little more than lip service to privacy and freedom of expression
concerns. While the main theaters in the Internet governance struggle are
clustered around the acronym soup of ICANN 2 and DNSOs, 3 I have been
1. WILLIAM J. CLINTON & ALBERT GORE,
available
(1997),
COMMERCE
ELECTRONIC

JR., A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL

at <http://www.ecommerce.gov/
framewrk.htm> (discussing the need for a set of globally recognized commercial law

rules) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK].
2. ICANN is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. ICANN
owes much of its authority to an agreement with the U.S. Department of Commerce. See
Memorandum of UnderstandingBetween the U.S. Department of Commerce and ICANN
(visited

Mar.

3,

1999)

<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/

icann-memorandum.htm>.
3. DNSO is an acronym for "Domain Name Supporting Organization." The Commerce Department's White Paper on Management of Internet Names and Numbers-a
Statement of Policy dated June 10, 1998-suggested that ICANN "could rely on separate,
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resisting what one might hyperbolically call an attempted "trademark
grab. ' 4 The experience risks turning me into a nationalist. If nothing else,
it has reinforced an already strong belief that governance structures matter
at least as much as the content of any ephemeral set of rules. As Jean
Monnet put it, "nothing is possible without men [sic], nothing is lasting
without institutions." 5 Attention to institutional issues, however, is where
the Magaziner Report now appears most lacking.
II. WHOSE GOVERNANCE?
It may seem odd to accuse the Magaziner Report of insufficient attention to institutional issues when the document begins with a declaration of
principles which on first reading appear to suggest close attention to the
institutional design of e-commerce regulation. These five principles are:
" The private sector should lead.
* Governments should avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce.
* Where governmental involvement is needed, its aim should be to
support and enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple legal
environment for commerce.
* Governments should recognize the unique qualities of the Internet.
" Electronic
commerce over the Internet should be facilitated on a
6
basis.
global

diverse and robust name and number councils responsible for developing, reviewing, and
recommending for the board's approval policy related to matters within each council's
competence. Such councils, if developed, should also abide by rules and decision-making
processes that are sound, transparent, protect against capture by a self-interested party
and provide an open process for the presentation of petitions for consideration." Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,750 (1998), available
at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_598dns.htm> [hereinafter White
Paper].
4. For an explanation, see A. Michael Froomkin, A Critique of RFC 3 (last modified Feb. 21, 1999) <http://www.law.miami.edu/-amf>. See also Pamela Samuelson, The
Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134 (for perspective on how intellectual property
rights holders seek to manipulate legal rules to their pecuniary advantage).
5. JEAN MONNET, MEMOIRES 360 (1976) ("Rien n'est possible sans les hommes,
rein n'est durable sans les institutions.").
6. FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, Principles2-3.
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Despite these declarations of principle, in hindsight it seems clear that
what is missing from the Frameworkfor Global Electronic Commerce is
... a framework. There is a vision in the Magaziner Report that might
merit the word "strategic"-there is some sense that we are here today and
we wish to navigate to be there tomorrow-so it could be unfair to say
that the Magaziner Report is consumed by tactics. It is fair to say, however, that the Magaziner Report is consumed by short-term policies and
fails to grasp the consequences of the means proposed to achieve its shortterm ends for long-term global governance.
The tensions implicit in the Magaziner Report's approach to governance become evident when one considers the role contemplated for-the
private sector. The promise of no "undue" restrictions by government, but
rather "support" and "minimalist" rules, just sufficient to "facilitate" ecommerce "on a global basis" sounds uncontroversial. 7 On the one hand,
the private sector is portrayed in its heroic mode, needing only to have
moribund rules removed to allow its unleashed animal spirits to carry the
day. In effect, the private sector rules, or should rule. Yet, on the other
hand, the private sector needs to be supported, cosseted, and to have rules
optimized for it on a global basis. Thus governments have a three-faceted
role. First, they duly promulgate restrictions on e-commerce when needed.
Second, they facilitate e-commerce by creating simple, predictable rules.
Third, they join together to do more of the same. It might be possible to
keep both the promise of minimalist rules and the promise of activist intervention to make the world safe for e-commerce, but given the tenor of
the Magaziner Report's general recommendations, it seems most likely
that the interventionist tendency will win in any conflict between the two.
Indeed, while the rhetoric of the Magaziner Report exalts the private
sector and emphasizes its autonomy, the action program in the Magaziner
Report reveals a different view. Despite the free-market tone of the first
principle, the Magaziner Report is far from a libertarian document. Instead, the Magaziner Report opens up the possibility of a host of new rules
emanating from a variety of sources. The Magaziner Report's strategic
goal is to further the adoption of what its authors believe to be the right
rule set-one that creates an optimal climate for e-business-and the
authors are not at all doctrinaire about where those rules should come
from. Thus, the Magaziner Report proposes to work with and through
whatever institutions look most poised to advance the adoption of the right
rules. Sometimes this means private sector autonomy, other times it means
7. Id.
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local/national rule-making (akin to "subsidiarity"8), but most often it turns
out to mean some form of globalized rule-making. This is considerably
more government action than one might expect from a regime of "minimalist" rules.
A.

Private Sector Autonomy?

Despite the general tendency towards globalized rulemaking, there are
three areas where the Magaziner Report makes a fairly strong stand for
private sector autonomy. First, it gives strong support to private efforts to
address basic Internet governance issues such as the problems of allocation of domain names, although in practice it turns out that these efforts
are not all that private. 9 Second, the Magaziner Report supports the continued development of voluntary technical standards, which in Internet
terms is akin to supporting motherhood. And, third, the Magaziner Report
endorses a self-regulation regime for privacy principles in general defiance of the stronger measures suggested by the European Privacy Directive-although it warns that if self-regulation is not forthcoming, the government may find itself politically obligated to regulate. Here, private
sector autonomy takes precedence over privacy.
In contrast to this vision of private sector autonomy, consider the role
envisaged for the private sector in electronic payments. The Magaziner
Report admits that in the short term the private sector must lead in electronic payment systems because the technology is changing too quickly
for the government to regulate effectively. "In the near term," therefore,
the government role is limited to "case-by-case monitoring of electronic
payment experiments." 10 This is only temporary, however, for, "[f]rom a
longer term perspective, ... the marketplace and industry self-regulation

alone may not fully address all issues. For example, government action
may be necessary to ensure the safety and soundness of electronic payment systems, to protect consumers, or to respond to important law enforcement objectives.""1 Of course, the private sector will be consulted to
"ensure that governmental activities flexibly accommodate the needs of
the emerging marketplace." ' 2 Consider also the role foreseen for con8. Subsidiarity is the devolution of responsibility to smaller political units in the
context of a federal system.
9. Compare FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, § 4, at 11 (discussing domain name issues), with White Paper,supra note 3 (calling on a public body, WIPO, to make recom-

mendations on domain name management).
10. FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, § 1, at 6.

11. Id.
12. Id.
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tracting parties on the Internet. The Magaziner Report envisions a world
where freedom of contract is king, and parties will be masters of their
contract, right down to choice of law and forum. Nevertheless, parties
should expect to bargain in the shadow of a single, world-wide, agreed
U.C.C.-like set of rules to be developed at the international level.
Ultimately, in the Magaziner Report vision, the private sector will not
lead; it will instead hold sway within the confines defined for it, its traditional role in a mixed capitalist economy. Strangely, it may turn out that in
the Magaziner Report vision of the near future, certain private parties will
find their greatest empowerment and autonomy not in the marketplace, but
in the bargaining process by which the new global rules shaping that marketplace will formed.
B. Local/National Government Rulemaking
The Magaziner Report seems to find almost no role for state/local
governments in the regulation of e-commerce. They do not appear often in
the document, except when they are to be discouraged from levying Internet taxes. One might say that this absence follows from the international
nature of the Internet. The Magaziner Report implicitly argues that if ecommerce rules are to be consistent, then policies need to be made at least
at the national level, and perhaps at the global level. 13 Given that in the
U.S. the primary regulatory authority for the law of sales has tended to rest
with the states (with harmonization enhanced by coordinated law projects
such as the U.C.C.), this would represent a larger shift towards federal or
international rulemaking than perhaps the Magaziner Report lets on.
In contrast, national rulemaking figures in the Magaziner Report in
two ways. First, there are a few areas which are identified as suited for
straightforward national legislation. Examples include legislation on
server/provider liability, 14 fraud prevention in general, 15 and the regulation
of cryptography. 16 We must accept cryptography control as sui generis,
though headed for the footnotes of history.', But how exactly Internet
fraud became primarily a matter of federal, and even international, jurisdiction is more asserted than explained. Securities regulation excepted,
most law relating to commercial fraud, like most contract law, has traditionally been a state responsibility. Perhaps the Magaziner Report's tilt
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See
See
See
See
See

id. § 3.
id. § 4, at 9.
id. § 8, at 19-20.
id. § 6, at 15.
infra text accompanying notes 33-35.

OF GOVERNMENTS AND GOVERNANCE

19991

towards federal/international jurisdiction reflects the current U.S. reality
that the majority of law enforcement and prosecutors with experience in
Internet-related crime work for the larger, usually federal, departments.
Some matters, such as the issuance of rules to combat online securities
fraud, are properly national (although there is some concurrent regulatory
jurisdiction at the state level).
Garden-variety fraud that moves off-shore presents jurisdictional
problems, and new opportunities for international cooperation among law
enforcement bodies, but it is less evident that it requires new substantive
rules. Nevertheless, an argument might be made to justify this tilt: arguably because the Internet makes every consumer transaction feel equally
local, and because absent a robust digital signature infrastructure consumers are not able to verify the nationality of a merchant,1 8 potentially
fraudulent consumer transactions are now more similar to potentially
fraudulent securities transactions. Consumer protection law therefore must
make provisions at the national and international levels for cross-border
fraud, just as the securities regulation regime has done. However, no such
argument is found in the Magaziner Report, and it is vulnerable to the
counter-argument that the best cure is the provision of technical means
such as a robust digital signature infrastructure' 9 (sometimes called a
"public key infrastructure" or PKI) rather than national or supra-national
rulemaking.
It is easier to understand how a concern with the preservation of values
of free expression leads the Magaziner Report to the assertion of national
primacy when it comes to content controls and the regulation of both political and commercial speech. Indeed, the Magaziner Report states that
not only will the U.S. retain full autonomy on matters of free expression,
but that the U.S. will try to spread the gospel of the First Amendment
throughout the world. 20 This deserves great praise because freedom of expression is far too important to be risked to the doubtful processes proposed for electronic commerce rulemaking.
C. Harmonization
Second, and perhaps even more important, nations figure as both participants and subjects in the harmonization of international law. Through18. See generally A. Michael
in

Electronic

Commerce,

Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties

75

OR.

L.

REv.

49

(1996),

available

<http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/trusted.htm>.
19. See id. (explaining function and uses of a public key infrastructure).
20. See FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, § 8, at 18.

at
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out the Magaziner Report one finds calls for international cooperation of
various sorts, for action by international organizations, and for legal standardization generally.
International legal harmonization happens in a variety of ways, ranging from highly decentralized to top-down rulemaking. A few examples
illustrate the spectrum of means that might be available.
* The most decentralized form of harmonization occurs when norms,
usages of trade, lex mercatoria,or the like spontaneously develops within
a (usually specialized) transnational (usually commercial) community.
0 The second most decentralized form of harmonization happens
when one jurisdiction's law becomes the de facto rule for another place,
perhaps due to regulatory arbitrage. For example, if a country with excellent Internet connectivity has a policy of allowing full freedom of expression and anonymous Internet access, this policy will have effects on every
other nation that chooses to allow a full Internet feed.2 1
* A third form of harmonization occurs in the context of regulatory
competition, when one jurisdiction chooses to copy another's rules,
whether as part of a race to the bottom, or a struggle to the top.
* Governments participate in a fourth type of harmonization when
they engage in communal law reform projects, e.g. under the auspices of
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), that produce model laws that are then presented to states for their
enactment, much as the Commissioners on Uniform Laws in the United
States produce model legislation that is presented to the states for their approval.
9 Fifth, supra-national bodies are often designed and empowered to
harmonize the law of member states, with the European Union and the
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") being major examples.
* And finally, although sometimes cumbersome to enact, international and especially multilateral treaties potentially are a very powerful
source of legal harmonization.
21. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet As a Source of Regulatory
Arbitrage, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL

INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 129 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997), available at <http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/arbitr.htm>.
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There are innumerable differences between each of these modes of
harmonization, and of course not every one will be available, much less
appropriate, to serve as the solution to any given perceived problem. The
key differences, however, are the extent to which these processes are
democratic, and the extent to which they are subject to capture. Although a
great deal depends on the nature of the issue and the circumstances, on
balance it seems that among the options subject to governmental control,
the option of presenting model laws to a legislature for adoption is best
calculated to produce legal harmonization without sacrificing basic democratic values.
Let me quickly admit that we do not begin from the highest baseline,
and that motives are sometimes purer than the word "capture" may suggest. No process of human decision making, and certainly none that involves institutions, can ever be perfectly democratic, or completely immune from capture. And certainly the lawmaking process in the United
States shows signs of suffering in this department. Indeed, at a conference
organized at the University of California, Berkeley less than a year ago,
many joined in an effort to explore the ways in which proposed Article 2B
of the UCC would favor certain commercial interests over other participants in the market. 22 That experience also serves to remind us that one
person's "capture" is another person's sincere belief that optimalities are
found in different places. But that experience also serves to remind us of
the salutary effect of bringing one's proposal before a jury of one's professional peers-and then having to try to get it through a real legislature.
D. Law "Reform" in Action
Even in a world of shades of gray there can be better and worse. International standard-making, although not beyond capture, on the whole fits
into the "better" category. The Internet Engineering Task Force ("IETF")
process of long-winded discussion and peer review retains virtues even as
the corporate vice-presidents are crowding into the process. In contrast,
most of the processes of international harmonization proposed in the
Magaziner Report strike me, on the whole, as likely to produce two kinds
of processes that both fall into the "worse" category: (1) the traditional
22. See Symposium, Intellectual Property and Contract Law in the Information
Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Transactions in Information and Electronic Commerce, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 809 (1998);
Symposium, IntellectualPropertyand ContractLaw for the Information Age: The Impact
of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Information and Commerce, 87 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1999).
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multi-lateral treaty process, and (2) an international version of the process
that produced Article 2B, without legitimating ratification by legislatures.
For all their virtues, treaties are not democracy at its finest. At best,
treaties are negotiated by unelected delegates of elected officials; they get
to negotiate with their counterparts and with the unelected delegates of
despots. The ability of elected officials outside the executive branch, and
all but the best-informed and well-financed interest groups, to influence
the negotiation process is ordinarily attenuated-although in rare cases far
from zero as the recent career of Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Jesse
23
Helms demonstrates. Treaties come to legislatures in a form which
largely is not amendable. 24 In the U.S., treaties are subject to ratification in
only one House; at times they are a means for canny administrations to get
Congressional agreement to things that would never have passed both
houses if seen to be of U.S. origin. Some will call the practice of using international processes to achieve results unachievable by ordinary legislation, such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, a form of high statecraft. Even if true, when it reaches the regulation of the ordinary commercial life of the nation, it is statecraft with significant costs: treaties are
costly to break and hard to amend.
Purely private lawmaking is near the other extreme of the continuum
of harmonization mechanisms. An international analog of the private
lawmaking process that produced Article 2B may be even more discomforting: when the topic is international harmonization the meetings are often farther away, the air tickets and hotels cost more, and even more people are forced to disenfranchise themselves as the process drags on and
their time and money become exhausted. Only those with fee-paying clients, or with obsessions, can stay the course, and yet it is only a matter of
time before the twin cries of laches and estoppel are heard in the land. The
result gains democratic legitimacy when adopted by a legislature, but a
flawed process is nonetheless troubling because the proposals may come
to the legislature with a patina of legitimacy they may not deserve.
The WIPO domain name system/trademark ("DNS/TM") process in
which I have been an "Expert" participant is worse still, because the results will never have to be presented to a legislature. WIPO is a body formally composed of its member states, but blessed with an energetic, intel23. See, e.g., Richard L. Berke & Steven Lee Myers, In Washington, Few Trifle

With Jesse Helms, N. Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1997, § 1, at 1 (noting and describing power
wielded by current Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee).
24. Nations can ratify a treaty with reservations attached, but there are diplomatic
costs to this practice.
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ligent, and surprisingly well-financed Secretariat. In part at the request of
the U.S. government, 25 WIPO took on the task of crafting recommendations relating to intellectual property concerns caused by the increasing
use of domain names as a marketing tool. The recommendations will be
passed on to the fledgling Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers ("ICANN"), a private not-for-profit California corporation
charged by the U.S. government with taking over key coordination functions for the technical management of the Internet. ICANN is not formally
obligated to accept WIPO's recommendations, but there is likely to be
considerable political pressure for it to take some or all of them, and
ICANN currently is not formally accountable to anyone.
There is no denying that the DNS/TM problem is complex. It involves
conflicts caused by trying to map a trademark system that is both geographic and sectoral onto a domain name space that is world-wide and has
only one .com. In addition, there are conflicts between trademark owners
and those with other legitimate interests in a domain name-interests that
range from nicknames and surnames to criticism and parody. In addition,
there are conflicts caused by speculative behavior and hoarding (sometimes termed "cybersquatting" or "cyberpiracy"), or outright attempts to
deceive by passing off one site as associated with another's brand.
WIPO responded to this challenge by proposing that ICANN use its
(arguable) leverage over the bodies that will control the databases of mappings between Internet domain names and IP numbers to impose a series
of contractual duties on all users of those databases. 26 Details aside, the
key point is that WIPO proposed a series of contracts of adhesion that
would result in every registrant in .com, .net, or .org having to agree to a
loser-pays arbitration under substantive rules that likely would differ from
the laws applied by a competent court. No treaty or legislation would be
required. As the arbitrators would be instructed to supplement applicable
national law with certain "principles" identified by WIPO, some results
likely would differ from what a court would do. At this writing, the final
report has not been written, and there remains at least some hope that it
will be much changed from an Interim Report that I believe is biased in
favor of intellectual property rights holders.27
25. See White Paper,supra note 3.

26. See World Intellectual Property Organization, The Management of Internet
Names

and

Addresses:

Intellectual

Property

Issues

(Dec.

23,

1998)

<http:/lwipo2.wipo.intlprocesslenglrfc-html>(Interim Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process) [hereinafter WIPO Interim Report].
27. See Froomkin, A Critique of RFC 3, supra note 4.
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The WIPO process represents an innovative experiment in negotiation
between a United Nations body and the private sector. Once having
authorized the initial process, the member states have been conspicuous by
their absence, at least as a formal matter, except as commentators in response to the various "requests for comments" authored by the Secretariat
staff. Regardless of the merits of the WlPO proposals, there can be little
debate that the public participation in the process has been dominated by
intellectual property rights holders and their lawyers and trade associations.28 Similarly, the Secretariat staff appear to be very sincerely committed to WIPO's mission of the promotion of intellectual property
rights-so much so that to even think about "capture" almost seems besides the point.
The WIPO DNS/TM process has certainly been public in a formal
sense, with a series of meetings around the world, and web pages displaying documents and public comments. But public participation has been
low for a number of reasons, including poor publicity outside the intellectual property community, and especially the competition for the attention
of the relatively small number of people focused on the issue of Internet
governance. Most of them understandably have focused on decisions relating to the structure of ICANN rather than on a merely advisory report,
even one likely to be influential. Turnout at the public hearings I have attended has been small-usually under 100 and sometimes about 50, and
(with the exception of the Washington D.C. event that followed a publicity
campaign I organized) comprised almost entirely of trademark lawyers or
Internet service providers. 9There have also been over 150 e-mailed
comments.
The dearth of consumer representatives, public interest groups, and
citizens groups participating in the WIPO process should serve to remind
us all of the many reasons why we entrust major aspects of social policy
making to elected officials. Legislatures and national executives are not
paragons of rectitude. But when they are elected, the same political proc28. Since I delivered this paper in Berkeley the balance has been somewhat redressed, in substantial part due to the written comments to WIPO by several members of
the conference audience. See, e.g., Kurt Opsahl, Law Professors, Academics, Students,
Attorneys and Industry (last modified Mar. 19, 1999) <http://wipo2.wipo.int/
dnscomments/rfc3/0164.html> (submitting letter signed by more than 60 opponents of
RFC 3).
29. I base this on my attendance at the Toronto, Rio de Janeiro, Brussels and
Washington, D.C. second round consultations. Transcripts of these hearings, and the Singapore and Dakar hearings also, will be available at <http://wipo2.wipo.int/process/eng/
consult2.html>.
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ess that may make them over-solicitous to those bearing campaign contributions imposes some form of accountability to the public at large.
Equally important, presentation of a matter to an elected official is a way
of putting a question onto the public agenda. WIPO has a very nice set of
web pages that lay out the issues at stake in the DNSITM process and lay
out the schedule for its public meetings in various world capitals. 30 There
is no particular reason, however, to assume that anyone is necessarily going to know that those web pages are there, or would necessarily visit
them. In contrast, a hearing in front of a subcommittee, a vote by a house
of Congress, or even a publication of a proposed rule in the federal register
by an unelected bureaucrat, would serve to put the public (in one country)
on notice in a tolerably effective way-at least in a routine and knowable
way-of the rules that someone proposes to lay down upon them.
Indeed, it is not obvious that all the relevant portions of governments
understood what was going on. WIPO sent notices of its proposals to
every one of its member states, but one suspects from the responses received that these were directed at the patent and trademark offices with
which WIPO ordinarily corresponds. 3 1 Whether these
notices were then
32
circulated to other departments is hard to ascertain.
E. Is E-Commerce Harmonization Necessary?
The world envisioned by the Magaziner Report, at least in the parts
that use the rhetoric of the leading role of the private sector, is one in
which the contractual autonomy of parties extends to making enforceable
contracts with choice of law and choice of forum. Competent parties with
the ability to pick law and forum may not need as much international legal
harmonization. Whether harmonization is necessary becomes doubly important if the processes used for achieving harmonization create or deepen
a democratic deficit.
Undoubtedly, there are areas where some harmonization is required.
Without basic plumbing such as the recognition and enforcement of electronic contracts, online commerce cannot flow safely. After the basics,

30. See, e.g., World Intellectual Property OrganizationInternet Domain Name Process (visited Apr. 6, 1999) <http://wipo2.wipo.int/process/eng/processhome.html>.

31. Comments and responses are available
at <http://wipo2.wipo.int/
dns_comments/rfc3/index.html>.
32. At least within the U.S. government, consultation was imperfect. Eric Menge,
Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, Statement at the WIPO consultative meeting (Washington, D.C.) (Mar. 10, 1999) (stating that he had only learned of
the proposals a week earlier).
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however, clarity will ordinarily suffice if parties have the autonomy to
contract around legal impediments. From a government's point of view,
the major areas that require additional harmonization are those where risks
exist that citizens will engage in undesirable forms of regulatory arbitrage
or that consumers will be preyed upon by the unscrupulous. Governments
and all those who consider taxes the price of civilization have a common
interest in controlling opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion. Similarly, governments concerned about various law enforcement issues, especially the control of money laundering, may have common cause to make
inter-jurisdictional agreements for the regulation of electronic cash and
transborder deposit-taking. And, considerations of consumer protection
(which the private sector tends to lean against rather than lead) may argue
for rules requiring transparency or rules regularizing expectations.
Other forms of regulatory arbitrage suit U.S. interests. The Magaziner
Report correctly identifies the enhancement of freedom of expression as
something too valuable to risk to a multilateral process designed to create
some international set of content controls. Given our federal system, however, it seems a little odd to find not only that subsidiarity is mostly absent
from the Magaziner Report, but that the contribution of nations as "big
labs of democracy" is not recognized.
III. CONCLUSION
Hindsight, of course, is a beautiful thing. Two years ago, when the
Magaziner Report first issued, I saw none of this. Instead I was excoriating
the Magaziner Report for failing to take a principled stand on reform of
cryptography regulation. At the time, I thought that one of the best things
the government could do for e-commerce would be to reverse its twin
policies of manipulating markets to favor cryptographic "key escrow" and
its long-standing ban on the export of meaningful cryptography. Unable to
make headway against the Administration consensus in favor of those
policies, 33 the Magaziner Report echoed the Janus-like pronouncements
that the Administration supported strong cryptographic security measures,
so long as one did not have enough to ensure true security and went on to

33. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography,

the Clipper Chip and the Constitution, 143 U. PENN. L. REv. 709 (1995), available at
<http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/clipper.htm>; A. Michael Froomkin, It
Came

From Planet

Clipper, 1996

U.

CHI.

L.

FORUM

<http://www.law.mianii.edu/-froomkin/articles/planet-clipper.htm>.
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available at
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other things. 34 Today, as strong consumer cryptography spreads around
the globe, the Magaziner Report's timidity on this issue almost seems the
better part of valor. With even France proposing to liberalize its rules to
allow unrestricted use of 128-bit cryptography, 3 5 it seems increasingly
likely that U.S. policies restricting the spread of strong consumer cryptography are becoming irrelevant, Strong cryptography may not be built into
Windows 2001, but it will be in the operating system of the near future.
The same social process that is making U.S. cryptography policy increasingly irrelevant internationally suggests that top-down regulations of
the type proposed in the Magaziner Report may become irrelevant too. If
that scenario is at all real, it may be one more reason to balk at processes
that do not have a democratic pedigree. If the private sector is poised to
lead from the bottom up, perhaps we should celebrate that, not stomp on it,
even (especially) if the redistributive effects of this evolution disadvantage
large, established parts of the corporate sector at the expense of small
companies arising in the new web-based economy. But it is one thing to
celebrate market-driven outcomes (corrected for market failures), and to
value market-making technical standardization. It is quite another thing to
tolerate private sector leadership when it clothes itself in the guise of
"bottom-up rulemaking" but actually seeks to use government or government-like power to lock in advantages enjoyed by established firms, often
at the expense of consumers or new competitors.
The real challenge comes in telling legitimate processes apart from the
others. True "bottom-up" outcomes are entitled to respect. Not every privatized rulemaking procedure carries the same legitimacy, however. The
WIPO process in which I participated involved limited consultation, and
opaque decision-making as the reports and recommendations were all
written by the Secretariat staff in secret. It featured what appeared from
my admittedly partisan perspective to be disproportionate input by trademark holders (as opposed to actual and would-be domain name holders
without trademarks), especially in the period before I began to kick up a

34. True security would make it difficult or impossible for law enforcement and
intelligence agencies to intercept communications when they, and a court, believe it necessary.
35. See Confirence de presse de Monsieur Lionel JOSPIN, Premier ministre, 6
l'issue du Comitj interministirielpour la socigti de l'information H6tel de Matignon
(Jan. 19, 1999) <http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/PM/D190199.HTM>; see also
Dicret n' 99-199 du 17 mars 1999 definissant les categories de moyens et de prestations
de cryptologie pour lesquelles la procedure de declaration prdalable est substitue 6
celle d'autorisation(Mar. 19, 1999) <http://jya.com/decret031799.htm>.
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fuss. Rather than be presented to one or more legislatures for ratification,
the result will be presented to ICANN, a private non-profit corporation,
and if accepted by ICANN will be imposed contractually on all registrants
in global top-level domains. This contrasts with the adoption of a technical
standard which, at least until the network effects kick in, attracts adherence without the need for any form of external pressure or coercion.
The WIPO process also contrasts with democratic processes. Democratic societies, and especially the U.S., have evolved elaborate techniques
for giving notice of upcoming decisions, and making it possible to spot
capture in the lawmaking process. Various countervailing advocacy and
special interest groups monitor the legislative process seeking to represent
the interests of the public or segments of it. Relative to the size of the
need, the equivalent public sector is much more attenuated at the international level, and monitoring is in any event much more difficult as institutions are less transparent and much more diverse and spread over the
world. As a result, even active citizens and legislators are less able to
weigh the results of internationalized rulemaking processes, not least because they cannot have confidence that if the process was seriously deficient someone would blow the whistle. Even the existence of a selfproclaimed whistle-blower is not enough: there is no particular reason to
believe that the people claiming a substantive or procedural flaw have a
way of getting the attention of relevant auditors, nor for thinking that the
auditors have any way of judging the credibility of the source even if they
happen to hear the communication.
The difference between the governance procedures endorsed by the
Magaziner Report, of which the WIPO process is but one example, and
true bottom-up rulemaking can be analogized to the difference between a
proprietary standard and Open Source software. 36 Like a manufacturer
choosing a proprietary standard, in the WIPO process a single body makes
decisions, in relative privacy, after soliciting the degree of input it feels is
appropriate. The outcome of the process ought then to be launched on the
marketplace of ideas. Instead, the proprietary legal standard threatens to
become dominant in its category because ICANN will present consumers
with a fait accompli. In its Interim Report, WIPO proposes that ICANN
impose WIPO's ideas on registries, who would in turn impose them on
registrars who would in turn be required to impose them on domain name
36. On Open Source software, see GNU General Public License (visited Apr. 6,
1999) <http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html> (text of model license); Ira V. Heffan,
Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in The Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1487

(1997). I owe the analogy to a conversation with Patrick Gudridge.
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registrants. 37 This is more lock-in than is allowed in product markets; even
Microsoft's efforts to lock in a large market share by making Windows the
required default option on all personal computers sold by a given manufacturer could be reversed by the consumer. It also contrasts with the
propagation of open source software, which can freely be copied or modified by anyone so long as the source is open and it is licensed for free. The
terms of the open source license are imposed on subsequent designers who
choose to incorporate or user of the code, but the decision whether to use
the code is left to them.
Undoubtedly it was not the intention of the Magaziner Report to endorse proprietary private lawmaking. We accept proprietary legal solutions when they emanate from a legislature, whatever the source of the
original draft. Legal solutions pioneered by judges we often dub "common
law" 38 and count on competition between states to produce the best, or a
range of acceptable solutions. Other models still must prove themselves.

37. See WIPO Interim Report, supra note 26,
57, 101, 142, 221.
38. Matters are more comiplex in the statutory context, where we sometimes dub
judicial creativity "common law-like"-and yet more complex in the constitutional context.

